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Abstract 
 
Intrinsic to the transition towards, and necessary 
for the success of digital platforms as a service (at 
scale) is the notion of human computation. Going 
beyond ‘the wisdom of the crowd’, human computation 
is the engine that powers platforms and services that 
are now ubiquitous like Duolingo and Wikipedia. In 
spite of increasing research and population interest, 
several issues remain open and in debate on largescale 
human computation projects. Quality control is first 
among these discussions. We conducted an experiment 
with three different tasks of varying complexity and 
five different methods to distinguish and protect 
against constantly underperforming contributors. We 
illustrate that minimal quality control is enough to 
repel constantly underperforming contributors and that 
this is constant across tasks of varying complexity.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Micro-tasks and crowd labour markets more 
broadly fundamentally shifted the international service 
economy [1] and had a disruptive effect on the 
digitisation of the workforce [2]. Still, at the centre of 
the debate on large-scale human computation projects 
is invariably a discussion of quality [3]. This is due in 
part to the fact that a suitable and scalable mechanism 
for the ex-ante detection of constantly underperforming 
contributors hasn’t been presented, or, as provocatively 
posed by Roman in his note  on crowdsourcing, there is 
no clear difference between “the wisdom of the crowd” 
and “the mob that rules” [4].  
There are an ever increasing number of quality 
control measures but a gap exists in core theory to 
assist researchers and crowd market stakeholders, i.e., 
contributors and employers. Crowd labour markets and 
crowdsourcing exist in a state of ‘perpetual beta,’ 
defined by Kazman and Chen as an acceptance by 
requestors of ‘on-going incompleteness” [5]. Tasks are 
structured so that the highest quality output is 
continually obtained and released [6]. Whilst 
requestors employ several mechanisms to assist in 
quality control, a holistic understanding of how well 
they work, why they work, and under which scenario 
they are working is missing. To date, commonly used 
tactics include qualification tests [7], pre-set 
qualifications [8]; trust models to determine the 
probability of diligent work [9]–[11]; hidden gold 
standard questions [12]; and the use of metrics such as 
solution acceptance [13] (see Related Work).  
This has given rise to a suite of quality control 
measures leveraged in an almost á la carte fashion. The 
choice of one method over another obviously impacts 
the design, and execution of crowd work. Much of the 
literature concentrates on incremental improvements in 
quality, but does not establish a robust theory on the 
effects of quality measures to various platform 
stakeholders, i.e. contributor, employer, and platform 
provider. In this paper, we attempt to shed light on this 
perspective of quality control, such as to afford 
stakeholders making informed decisions surrounding 
the choice(s) of quality control measures.  
One of the more challenging aspects from the 
perspective of organising platforms and the related 
policies is found in managing (constantly) 
underperforming contributors. This is in part due to a 
lack of insights into intent: Are contributors 
deliberately underperforming, or are they in need of 
additional coaching in order to perform to standard? 
This is obviously not an exhaustive list, and there may 
be a host of other answers to this question. Our study 
aims to illustrate that constantly underperforming 
contributors will not take on tasks that feature quality 
control mechanisms, irrespective of the quality control 
measure in place. Our objective is not to play one 
measure off against another, but rather contextualise 
their impact more holistically. Here we note that we do 
not use the term spammer, as we cannot predict the 
intention of our contributors.  
Our research employs a 3 x 5 factorial experimental 
design of three task types with varying complexities 
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and five different quality control methods to measure 
the impact of quality control and task complexity on 
output quality (see Study Design). Our results indicate 
that the employed quality control method does not 
have a significant impact on response quality. In the 
experiment, it was sufficient to simply state that a 
qualification test is necessary to repel constantly 
underperforming contributors (see Results).  
In our experiment most contributors were diligent, 
which has a strong implication on the management of 
crowd labour platforms. Constantly underperforming 
contributors by our definition (see Measurement) were 
only present in conditions with no quality control. This 
leads us to argue that expansive quality control support 
and applications are overused (see Conclusion). 
Simple, resource-light mechanisms are sufficient to 
assure quality results. In order to raise the global 
quality standards of crowdsourced contributions 
resources should be directed and dedicated to adequate 
training of contributors (see Implications). 
 
2. Related Work  
Quality control within crowdsourcing platforms 
appears in many ways, quality being one of the 
attributes of the crowd [18] [3]. Quality control is not 
only of interest to corporations and business: creative 
endeavours [14], policy and budget deliberations [15]–
[17], open collaboration platforms [19], and the 
broader (scientific) community [4] stand to benefit as 
well. There are several other factors that may affect the 
quality of the work as per literature including the 
characteristics of the worker and demographics [20] or 
personality traits [21].  
Literature in the field of crowdsourcing suggests 
various measures for assuring quality and authenticity. 
[22] tested the difference of user behaviour with 
honour codes compared to a serious warning message 
by conducting two experiments. Their first experiment 
subjects were college students taking an online test and 
the second experiment was Amazon MTurk. [22] 
found that replacing a traditional honour code with a 
strict warning decreases the chances of cheating in 
both student and MTurk environments by 50%. The 
authors state that informing the user regarding the 
negative consequences of an action by warning them 
results in lesser tendency of doing it. Kittur et al. [23] 
conducted two experiments to test MTurk as a user 
study platform. In their first experiment, they asked 
MTurkers to rate Wikipedia articles regarding their 
accuracy, writing, neutrality, structure, and the quality 
of the article. The workers were asked to fill a text box 
suggesting improvements to the article to verify if the 
user had really read the article. The authors did not find 
a correlation between the MTurkers ratings and the 
actual Wikipedia administrators. Their second 
experiment was the second version of the first one with 
slight modifications and additions in which they had 
both subjective and objective questions. Users were 
asked verifiable quantitative questions before rating the 
article. The users were asked to provide 4-6 keywords 
as a summary for the article. The results in experiment 
two demonstrated a significant correlation between the 
workers’ ratings and the Wikipedia admin ratings. 
Kittur et al. [23] suggest that combining objective and 
subjective information gathering in user study tasks 
may be useful in micro-task markets.  
Difallah et al. [24] discuss that crowdsourcing 
platforms do not share the worker’s identity and they 
do not guarantee the quality of the work, which results 
in unreliability of the system. Cheaters were 
categorized a priori and posteriori and the authors 
discussed anti-adversarial techniques for encountering 
them. They suggest that sophisticated task formulation 
is a suitable obstacle for cheaters, however, it increases 
the burden on the requester whose main aim is to get 
the work done and suggest that applying traditional 
anti-spamming techniques such as CAPTCHA is a 
good option. They suggest that discouraging cheaters 
from doing a task is better than controlling the quality 
of completed tasks. 
 
2.1 Pre-Selecting Contributors 
Quality control mechanisms differ in their 
approach. In general, Kittur et al. [25] differentiate 
“up-front task design” and “post-hoc result analysis” as 
the two main methods to control work quality in a 
crowdsourcing context.  
Crowdsourcing platforms provide the means for 
employers to pre-select contributors based upon 
specific task requirements or employer preferences. 
Geiger et al. [26] define pre-selection as “a means of 
ensuring a minimum ex-ante quality level of 
contributions.” In other words, an employer will use a 
pre-selection process or test to mitigate the risk of poor 
quality solutions by screening potential contributors 
based upon the completion of some process that 
demonstrates certain knowledge or skills. 
Oleson et al. [12] examine this process, which is 
typically performed via multiple-choice tests, and 
highlight as well as subsequently criticise a key 
assumption in this approach: that if the contributor 
passes the test, they will then perform the task well, 
even in the absence of direct or tangible incentives to 
do so. Similarly, if the contributor fails the test they 
may be banned from the task though not necessarily for 
the right reasons. This method is, however, simple to 
implement and also typically performs well. Pre-
selection via qualification tests is also likely to act as a 
barrier for “scammer” contributors. However, diligent 
contributors may not select the task due to an increased 
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effort or missing credential on their part. Answers to a 
qualification test may also be shared amongst users, 
which reduces effectiveness. 
2.2 Qualification Tests 
Some platforms use a qualification test, to not only 
determine the abilities of a contributor, but also access 
and assess their basic properties, as this information is 
often not available to crowd employers. Stolee and 
Elbaum [27] and Chen et al. [28] are examples here. 
They state that a qualification can also capture 
demographic (and similar) properties of the 
contributor, for example geographical location. This 
does, however, massively distort the concept of a 
qualification if personal attributes are considered.  
Similar to the basic notion of qualification tests are 
also initial screening questions based on reading 
attentiveness employed in order to minimize ‘click-
through’ behaviours [29]. Such measures aim to ensure 
that contributors are dedicating significant attention to 
key elements of information, like the instructions. 
 
2.3 In Task Quality Control 
An alternative method proposed by Ipeirotis et al. 
[10] and Sheng et al. [30] is to infer a level of trust in 
the contributor via the accuracy of their solutions. 
Trust, however, quickly becomes a complex and 
nuanced topic highly specific to the context in which it 
is considered. Also as an inherently intangible and 
intransitive construct it is very difficult to measure 
quantitatively; key for approximating (automatically) a 
contributor’s propensity for diligent or reliable work. 
Thus, Kern et al. [31] capture trustworthiness based on 
prior experience. They redundantly schedule tasks to 
multiple contributors to provide a basis to compare and 
estimate contributor reliability. This method 
demonstrated yielding high quality solutions. Yet 
without careful management the method is expensive 
in terms of redundantly issuing tasks (direct costs) and 
the additional effort needed to assess solution quality. 
Similarly, managing the crowd with respect to 
“rejected” answers can have other adverse effects, 
especially if the contributor has acted diligently.  
Oleson et al. [12] propose the use of gold standard 
questions (frequently used on MTurk, for example) to 
assess solution quality and contributor ability.  In their 
approach, subtasks with known solutions are injected 
into the task. The presence of these questions enables 
the accuracy of a given contributor to be estimated in 
task, and help improve the quality of their solutions by 
providing an explanation why the solution is incorrect. 
Contributors receive instant feedback on the accuracy 
of their performance. The approach, however, is 
limited to tasks that have a finite set of definite 
answers, and is inappropriate for tasks that rely on 
forms of subjectivity. However, such a mechanism 
provides a basis to also train a contributor, and enable 
self-evaluation of performance through feedback. The 
latter facilitates an integral element in the definition of 
competence: the evaluation of self-efficacy.  
Quality Control, among others, is one of the 
dimensions in Quinn and Bedersen's classification 
dimensions of human computation [32]. The authors 
state that the users might cheat or sabotage the system 
even if they are motivated for participation. We believe 
that the rationale for subpar performance is the 
motivation being extrinsic rather than intrinsic. It is 
intrinsic motivation that plays a significant role as 
described in Self Determination Theory [33].   
Ryan and Deci [33] define extrinsic motivation as 
“the performance of an activity in order to attain some 
separable outcome” the authors also discuss 
performing an activity to avoid punishment. Hence, we 
assume that the presence of any quality control 
procedure is efficient for quality as it invokes extrinsic 
motivation among contributors. 
Reflecting on the different avenues of quality 
control, it is clear that much work has been undertaken 
in aligning the need for quality control and methods to 
underpin and support this need. Given the findings in 
recent literature and considering the idea of extrinsic 
motivation in Self-Determination Theory, we propose 
the following research question in order to evaluate 
quality assurance measures in crowdsourcing:  
RQ: What is the relationship between quality control 
and perceived response quality in microtasks?  
We explore if applying specific quality control 
methods have a significant impact on contributors’ 
response quality, or simply whether just the announced 
the presence of a quality control method can prevent 
the contributors from underperforming.  
 
3. Study Design 
Our study had a three (task complexities) by five 
(quality control methods) factorial, between-group 
design. The experiment investigates three tasks of 
varying complexity. Following Allahbakhsh  et al. [3], 
the effort for completing each task are as high or 
higher than for cheating, disincentivizing constant 
underperformance. We hypothesize the order of tasks 
in terms of complexity to be as follows semantic 
similarity (least complex), question answering (more 
complex), and text translation (most complex).  
We repeated each task five times with different 
methods of quality control. For the first level of the 
control factor (none) we did not perform any quality 
control. For the second level (fake) we announced very 
prominently in the task description that we use 
introductory quizzes to check the qualification of 
contributors, yet contributors did not undertake a test. 
The third level (intro) announces an introductory quiz 
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and requires contributors to complete the quiz with 
80% accuracy; akin to qualification tests. In the fourth 
level (auto) we added a basic machine learning (ML) 
system to estimate the quality of a response and report 
this estimate to contributors; akin to in task quality 
control measures. The system provides feedback on a 
three level scale (good, acceptable, unacceptable). 
Finally, in the fifth level (wizard) we replaced the ML-
system by a human observer that decides the response 
quality. The scale was identical to the one used by the 
ML-system. Our objective with this measure is to 
represent an expert panel, reviewing each solution. 
We recruited all contributors via crowdflower, as it 
allows international payments to be processed. We 
restricted our recruitment population to top-workers 
who were native English speakers to stimulate simple 
methods that can be used by any requester. To control 
possibly confounding variables, provide feedback, and 
perform our own quality control we redirected 
contributors to our own webpage. After completing the 
task contributors received a code that they use to 
receive their payment through the crowdflower 
interface. The user interface (Figure 1) was identical 
for all 15 (three by five) conditions. In all conditions, 
contributors were shown three examples of correctly 
solved tasks and a description of the task. We used the 
same interface to collect quality ratings from human 
judges.  
We had a between-group design where each task 
had its own population. To ensure a this we used IP-
tracking and browser fingerprinting to ensure that 
contributors do not contribute to more than one 
condition. There was no overlap among populations in 
the groups. To ensure contributor privacy only hashes 
of browser fingerprints and IP’s were stored. 
3.1 Automated Feedback 
The automated feedback system applied in the level 
auto of the control factor requires some explanation. 
Runge et al. [34] have shown that in some natural 
language tasks the quality of a response can be 
estimated with a high accuracy by a combination of the 
time needed to complete a single request and the 
numbers of characters typed. Although the values of 
both variables and their meaning differ from task to 
task, a ML classifier is able to learn the relationship 
between the two variables (features) and the response 
quality with minimal training data.  
For our auto level, we classify responses into three 
different classes (good, acceptable, unacceptable) using 
a random forest classifier [35]. Supervised classifiers 
need labelled training data. We classified 90 responses 
of each task by hand. We randomly selected responses 
and classified them into the three classes until there 
were 30 samples per class. We stratified the training 
data randomly, selecting exactly 30 samples per class.  
For the experiment a random forest classifier was 
chosen, as tree-based classifiers are less sensitive to 
outliers and unbalanced sample sets [36]. In the given 
tasks, it is likely that we encounter outliers such as a 
contributor opening a task and leaving their working 
place for a while. Classifiers such as support vector 
machines are more sensitive to such outliers. Our 
classifier generated 10 random trees using Gini 
impurity [37] as the split criterion, built using the 
python sklearn package [38]. 
When the classifier estimates the response quality 
to be unacceptable we show a general warning that the 
response might need revision. If the response was 
acceptable, we did not show a message. For good 
responses, a message stating that the response was of 
good quality is shown. Messages appeared as a red text 
immediately after a contributor responded to a request. 
3.2 Measurements 
We consider two independent variables: the quality 
control method and task complexity as well as one 
dependent variable: perceived response quality. To 
measure perceived response quality, we asked two 
human judges to rate each response on a scale from 0.0 
(low quality) to 1.0 (high quality) in 10 increments. We 
calculated the average perceived response quality for 
each contributor as our measurement for quality. We 
consider contributors with an average perceived 
response quality below 0.6 as constantly 
underperforming, i.e. 40% unacceptable responses. 
Judges saw the initial request and answer. 
Additionally, judges had a slider to rate the response 
quality (see Figure 1). The interface did not show the 
rating of our automated feedback system. We ensured 
 
Figure 1: Crowdsourcing interface for the web-fragment 
annotation task. The interface is identical for all tasks. The 
rating slider (bottom) is only visible for our Raters when they 
judge the quality of a response. 
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that the process was blind. We randomly selected 
responses from all conditions and judges did not know 
the condition of a response. These judges were not 
involved in generating the training data for the 
automated feedback nor did they participate in the 
wizard conditions. We recruited the judges’ offline. 
We measure and report the agreement between 
judges using Krippendorff’s Alpha [39]. Additionally, 
we measure the correlation between our ML-systems 
prediction and our human judges. As our data violates 
the assumptions of the Pearson Product-Moment 
correlation we use Spearman’s ρ. 
Furthermore, the three tasks are tested for 
instruction clearness and contributor satisfaction using 
the build in metrics provided by crowdflower. Upon 
completion of a task, contributors can take a 
satisfaction survey. Contributors score the task on a 0-5 
scale for overall satisfaction, instruction clearness, test 
question fairness, payment, and ease of job. Results of 
these quizzes are reported with each task. 
4. Procedure 
We collected all data for three independent tasks 
from the domain of natural language processing. The 
main interface for contributors is identical for all tasks. 
Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the user interface for 
the question-answering task. Table 1 shows the 
distribution of our contributors by level of quality 
control method and task complexity. 
 None Fake Intro Auto Wizard 
Semantic 17 19 17 18 19 
Question 19 17 16 19 18 
Translation 16 17 18 19 20 
Table 1: Distribution of contributors over all 15 
conditions. 
4.1 Word-based Semantic Similarity 
Semantic similarity plays an important role for 
many natural language processing tasks, especially 
word sense disambiguation and information retrieval 
[40], [41]. Humans are better than algorithms at rating 
semantic similarity between two words [7]. Involving 
paid online contributors can reduce costs, but the 
response quality is harder to predict. Constantly under-
performing contributors are still an issue for such tasks 
[11]. Different algorithmic approaches do exist [42]–
[44] but are not yet able to reproduce human level 
results [45]. The task issued in this treatment is itself 
not very complex, only requiring a good command of 
English. To ensure this, we restricted contributor’s 
origin to be in the US, UK, or Canada. We further 
restricted the task using a standard dataset [46] 
consisting of 353 word pairs. In the experiment, we 
recruited 90 contributors and collected ~9,500 
responses on the 353 word pairs.  
4.2 Question Answering 
Understanding natural language is still a 
challenging field for artificial systems [47]. Answering 
questions given in natural language or finding relevant 
search results to these questions are, despite the recent 
success of systems such as IBM Watson [48], unsolved 
challenges [49], [50]. As standard datasets for question 
answering seem too easy for human annotators with 
access to the internet, we designed a set of 50 questions 
so that using the question as a search string will not 
reveal the correct answer right away. 
We randomly selected 10 questions to be test 
questions for conditions with an introductory test 
(Intro, Auto, Wizard). We designed sets of possible 
answers to these 10 test questions by hand. Each 
answer set had ~10 answers from at least three 
different people. Answers were collected off-line from 
students and members of our research group. The 
response quality of a contributor is estimated by the 
semantic similarity between the contributor’s response 
and our exemplary answers. We take the highest 
similarity value as an estimate of quality. The method 
is calibrated by testing each of the handmade answers 
against the remaining answers in each set. The average 
similarity of answers on a scale from 0.0 (no 
similarity) to 1.0 (perfect similarity) is 0.65 (SD: 0.25). 
Responses within a margin of one standard deviation 
were considered acceptable. 
Each contributor could answer up to 80 questions. 
We collected 5,089 responses (57 on average) from 89 
contributors on crowdflower. We collected 1,017 
responses on average for each control level. 
4.3 Text Translation 
Text translation is a demanding task even for 
humans as in-depth knowledge of two different 
domains, the target and the source language, is 
required. Various approaches exist; applying 
crowdsourcing to translation targeted paraphrasing [51] 
and iterative collaboration between monolingual users 
[52] are two examples. Other common approaches 
utilize mono- or bilingual speakers to proofread and 
correct Machine Translation results [53]. For our 
experiment, we use a popular Wikipedia article in 
German on the Brandenburg Gate. Native speakers of 
German prepared a set of sentences from this article. 
For the set, we took the first 150 sentences from the 
respective article. Headlines, incomplete sentences and 
sentences that contained words in a strong dialect were 
removed. We requested translations for the remaining 
sentences from contributors via crowdflower. As the 
target language was English we used the same quality 
prediction method for conditions that included a pre-
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test as for the question answering task. Each 
contributor could translate up to 100 sentences. We 
collected 2,119 translations for the Vietnamese set and 
2,002 translations for the German set (total 4121) from 
90 contributors (46 on average). We collected 825 
sentences on average in each control condition. 
5. Results  
Before we analyse our data, we want to ensure that 
our presumption that the three different tasks have a 
distinct complexity is reasonable. We indeed found 
that the response quality is significantly lower for 
complex tasks. This indicates that the tasks do differ in 
their complexity. This is in line with the self-
assessment of contributors through crowdflowers 
satisfaction survey. We found that Ease Of Job 
negatively correlates with our presumed complexity 
ranking. The correlation is significant with p < 0.001. 
Table 2 shows the results of the satisfaction survey. 
 
 Satisfaction Clarity fairness Payment Ease 
Similarity 3.8 3.8  3.7  4.5 4.3 
Question 3.6 3.4 3.5  4.1 3.7 
Translate 3.7 3.9 3.3  4.4 3.1 
Table 2: Results of the self-assessment. From left to right 
the columns refer to overall satisfaction, instruction 
clearness, test question fairness, payment, and ease of job. 
It is not possible to calculate a SD as crowdflower only 
offers aggregated data. 
Then we ensure that our metric is reasonable. 
Perceived quality is used as this measure allows 
investigating quality over different tasks. Table 3 
shows that our judges have a substantial agreement on 
quality throughout all tasks. 
Before testing our results for significance, we 
ensured that our data is suitable for parametric tests. 
We used the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality [54] for 
each condition and did not find significant differences 
from a normal distribution.  
 Participants Judges Krippendorff’s α 
Similarity 90 2 0.808 
Question 89 2 0.838 
Translate 90 2 0.815  
Table 3: Inter-rater agreement on perceived response 
quality. The results are homogenous for all three tasks 
and indicate a substantial agreement between our judges. 
As we have different numbers of contributors in our 
conditions, we also verified that our conditions have 
equal variance for the dependent variable prior to 
executing an analysis of variance (ANOVA). As the 
distributions do not differ significantly from normal 
distributions we use Bartlett's test for homoscedasticity 
(equal variance) [55]. We found that the variance does 
not differ significantly between our conditions t(4) = 
2.764 , p = 0.598. As our data does not hold evidence 
that it violates the assumptions of the ANOVA, we 
analyse main and interaction effects with a two-way 
ANOVA to compare the effect of quality control and 
task complexity on the independent variable perceived 
response quality. Table 4 shows these results. 
 df SS MS F p sig. 
(C)ontrol 4 1.036 0.259 28.988 0.001 *** 
(T)ask 2 0.557 0.279 31.165 0.001 *** 
CxT 8 0.220 0.028 3.082 0.002 ** 
Residuals 254 2.270 0.009    
Table 4: ANOVA results of main and interaction effects. 
The first row shows the effect of the quality control 
method. The second row the effect of the task. The third 
row shoes the interaction effect between both factors. 
From the ANOVA results, we conclude that task 
complexity as well as the used quality control method 
have a significant influence on the perceived response 
quality. Furthermore, we found a significant interaction 
between both factors. We use Welch Two Sample t-test 
with Holm-Bonferroni correction as our post hoc 
comparison method. Table 5 presents differences in 
levels of the control factor. 
Task Complexity Affects Response Quality 
We analyse effects for each level of the task complexity 
factor, assuming that the average response quality 
deteriorates with higher complexity tasks. As seen in 
Table 6 and Figure 2 this assumption holds. Although 
this may seem obvious it substantiates the initial 
 
Figure 2: Task complexity affects response quality. The most 
complex task text translation (right) has a significantly lower 
average response quality than the more simplistic semantic 
similarity task (left) and the question answering task 
(middle). The figure shows a violin plot combining a boxplot 
and a kernel density plot. Thick dark lines indicate 1st and 3rd
quartiles the red lines population means. 
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assumption on task complexity. The Pearson moment 
correlation is 1.0 with an associated p < 0.001. 
 
Comp. M1 SD1 M2 SD2 T df p Sig. 
none fake 0.63 0.09 0.80 0.11 -8.21 100 0.00 *** 
none intro ... ... 0.79 0.12 -7.72 97 0.00 *** 
none auto ... ... 0.78 0.13 -7.67 105 0.00 *** 
none wiz. ... ... 0.79 0.13 -8.17 106 0.00 *** 
fake intro 0.80 0.11 0.79 0.12 0.44 102 0.66  
fake auto ... ... 0.78 0.13 0.74 106 0.46  
fake wiz. ... ... 0.79 0.13 0.25 107 0.80  
intro auto 0.79 0.11 0.78 0.11 0.29 104 0.77  
intro wiz. ... ... 0.79 0.13 -0.20 105 0.85  
auto wiz. 0.78 0.11 ... ... -0.50 111 0.62  
Table 5: Welch two sample t-tests with Holm correction 
comparing all levels of the quality control factor.  
 
Comp. M1 SD1 M2 SD2 T df p Sig. 
Sem. Quest. 0.81 0.13 0.77 0.11 2.45 169 0.02 * 
Sem. Trans. ... ... 0.70 0.10 6.07 167 0.00 *** 
Quest Trans. 0.77 0.11 0.70 0.10 4.10 177 0.00 *** 
Table 6: Results of Welch two sample t-tests with Holm 
correction. Line 1 compares level semantic to level 
question of the task complexity factor. Line 2 compares 
level semantic translation and the line three question to 
translation 
The results indicate that there is a significant 
difference between the levels none of control and the 
other four levels. The resulting p-values are below the 
0.001 alpha-level as seen in Table 5. Other levels do 
not differ significantly. Table 7 shows means and 
standard deviations between all levels of our two 
factors. Figure 3 further illustrates that the finding is 
constant for all tested tasks.  
 
 Semantic Question Translation 
 M SD M SD M SD 
none 0.62 0.09 0.68 0.09 0.60 0.08 
intro 0.84 0.11 0.78 0.09 0.74 0.11 
fake 0.85 0.10 0.81 0.11 0.72 0.09 
auto 0.89 0.07 0.76 0.06 0.70 0.10 
wizard 0.83 0.11 0.81 0.13 0.73 0.07 
Table 7: Means and standard deviations for perceived 
quality. Rows contain the five different quality control 
methods and columns the different tasks. 
We also investigated the proportion of constantly 
underperforming contributors (a contributor below a 
quality level of 0.6). We found that in all no-quality 
control conditions we had a substantial amount of 
contributors (N = 22) with an average response quality 
below 0.6. In all other conditions combined, we found 
11 contributors under this threshold. The proportion of 
underperforming contributors in the none conditions is 
0.42. Compared to the other conditions with a 
proportion of only 0.05 this is value is extremely high. 
In the auto level of the quality control factor a ML-
System predicted the response quality of contributors 
based on two features (number of characters typed and 
time needed to complete a request). To estimate the 
quality of this prediction we calculated the correlation 
between our ML-systems prediction and the average 
perceived quality. The ML-system rated responses on a 
scale with three ordered values (unacceptable (1); 
acceptable (2); good (3)). As this scale is ordinal and 
violates the assumptions of Pearson’s Product-Moment 
correlation we analysed the correlation using 
Spearman’s ρ. We found a substantial correlation 
between the predictions and the average perceived 
quality of our human judges ρ (937020) = 0.71, p < 
0.001. The correlation between the two human judges 
in comparison is ρ (463061) = 0.85, p<0.001. In 
contrast, the human raters who replaced the ML-
system in our wizard condition achieved a correlation 
of ρ (705574) = 0.78, p<0.001. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated the effect of different 
quality control methods on the response quality of 
contributors for tasks of varying complexity. We 
established their differing complexity and confirmed 
the order to be as follows semantic similarity (least 
complex), question answering (more complex), text 
translation (most complex). Figure 3: Quality control affects response quality only if there 
is no quality control at all. The differences in means between 
quality control methods are not significant.  
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We found that constantly underperforming 
contributors (by our definition contributors with less 
than 40% acceptable responses) are almost not present 
in all conditions of our experiment when a quality 
control method is in place. We however found a 
substantial amount of constantly underperforming 
contributors (almost 45%) in our control conditions 
(none) without a quality control method. 
Only mentioning a required introductory test 
(without actually doing the test, the fake level of the 
control factor) was sufficient to achieve the same 
response quality as the quality control methods. Even 
immediate human generated feedback was not able to 
raise response quality above the level of this faked 
introductory test. As hypothesized, the response quality 
does not differ across the different quality control 
methods. It only differs significantly between the 
none conditions (M = 0.63, SD = 0.03) and conditions 
with quality control (M = 0.79, SD = 0.05). This is an 
increase of more than 25% in response quality. 
We can therefore conclude that constantly 
underperforming contributors are aware of the fact that 
their contribution might fall short of required quality 
standards when taking a task. This also implies that 
very basic quality control methods are sufficient to 
promote diligent work. Yet, it is debatable if our fake 
introductory test would keep these results over time. It 
is very likely that contributors realize that the tests are 
not conducted, and it is also known that contributors 
share task information amongst themselves. However, 
we also demonstrated that extremely simple ML 
methods with task independent features as proposed by 
Krause et al. [50] can predict response quality on the 
fly. Such methods may provide quality control for 
tasks similar to the ones explored in this paper.  
 
7. Implications 
The core contributions of this study address 
platforms and requestors. We argued that multiple 
quality control measures exist, but effectiveness of said 
mechanisms at a meta-level is still under-addressed. 
This work addresses that gap, extending existing 
knowledge on the comparative effectiveness of various 
quality control regimes. Our findings suggest that 
increasingly complex, resource-intensive quality 
assurance mechanisms do not have better performance 
than simple mechanisms. As shown in this work, after 
an even basic controlling for response quality, 
underperformance per task drops considerably. 
Investments in simple mechanisms should be 
prioritised above resource-intensive mechanisms.  
Our work aspires to address the status of 
contributors as well. Diligent but underperforming 
contributors can exist for many reasons, and are likely 
to be wrongly classified as spammers. At the same 
time, response quality degrades with increasing task 
complexity. This points to the need for suitable training 
and developmental materials. Our argument is simple: 
rather than investing in post-hoc quality control, 
investing ad-hoc in training and skill development 
should increase quality globally. A natural extension is 
the creation and validation of credential regimes, 
something missing and drastically needed for 
underpinning and securing contributors’ rights in 
crowd labour markets [3], [13].  
Our findings indicate that as discussed in Self-
Determination Theory, the presence of any quality 
control method activates the extrinsic motivation – 
avoiding punishment - in contributors. Returning to the 
question of measure mechanics vs. the perception that 
workers have towards the broader notion of a quality 
measure being in place, based upon our initial results 
the latter maybe more impactful. This should not be 
interpreted as a sweeping dismissal of research into 
quality measures and their mechanics. Instead, it 
should highlight that the fundamental components of 
competence, where the evaluation of self-efficacy is 
just one, aligned with the reputation systems that 
crowd platforms employ act as a significant deterrent 
for underperforming workers. In other words, 
participation in such a task is expressing the belief of 
providing a valid solution by the contributor. Further 
study is, however, needed to more thoroughly evaluate 
this and enable a more rigorous theory on the interplay 
between quality control measures and the associated 
policies in crowd labour markets. 
 
8. Limitations and Future Work 
While a 3x5 factorial model is sizable, future work 
should cover more quality control mechanisms to 
assure the transferability of these results. Furthermore, 
it has yet to be seen if tasks in other domains than 
natural language processing yield similar results. 
We recognize that our minimal control mechanism 
(fake) without enforcement is not sustainable - 
contributors can and will realize that no quality control 
has in fact been enforced. A sustainable and low cost 
mechanism to elevate the performance of diligent but 
underperforming contributors must be developed and 
tested to complete the scope of this research. 
A worthy area of future research is support systems 
for those who worked diligently but are still 
underperforming. This is both for the requestor's side 
(i.e., clear task description writing) and contributor's 
side (i.e., developmental educational materials) [56].  
Particularly worthwhile would be the investigation 
of monetary incentivization of contributors' education 
(see e.g., [57], [58]). Monetized education-based tasks 
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could create the scenario that contributors are both 
learning to complete more and more complex tasks, 
while gaining skills and funding to be applied in their 
offline lives. An envisioned mechanism for this could 
be Massively Open Online Courses, where contributors 
register for the course to learn increasingly complex 
skills, and are financially rewarded with successful 
task mastery. Realized in its full depth and scope, this 
progressive step would comprehensively enhance of 
both crowdwork from a quality perspective and the 
overall, real life skillset of the contributors. 
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